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Explaining Informal Policy-Making Patterns in the Eurozone
Crisis: Decentralized Bargaining and the Theory of EU
Institutions
Abstract
During the Eurozone crisis, the so-called ‘Merkozy duumvirate’ emerged as an informal, but highly
visible  EU  policy-making  pattern.  This  article  asks  why  such  forms  of  decentralized  bargaining
emerge and what this implies for the theory of EU institutions. According to an approach based on
negotiation theory, the article argues that Merkozy is a strategic tool used by Germany to realize its
preferences on EU crisis management. Based on an incomplete contracts theory of EU institutions,
instead, the article analyses Merkozy as an informal institution created by France and Germany to
avoid  being  discriminated  by  supranational  institutions.  Both  approaches  are  employed  to  assess
Merkozy’s role in the decision-making process leading to the adoption of the Fiscal Compact.
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1Introduction
During  the  Eurozone  crisis,  particular  informal  policy-making  patterns  emerged  in  the  EU.  This
regards, among others, new forms of decentralized bargaining and, most prominently, the so-called
‘Merkozy  duumvirate’.1 The  label  ‘Merkozy’  refers  to  the  tight  relationship  between  German
Chancellor Angela Merkel and former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who engaged in sustained
coordination beyond the traditional limits of the Elysée Treaty. While the Franco-German coordination
in EU policy-making as such is certainly not new, the high visibility of ‘Merkozy’, the intensity of
cooperation,  and the claim to steer  the EU decision-making process  at  the  time is  unprecedented
(Schild 2013).
This  article  aims  at  explaining  the  emergence  of  such  informal  and  decentralized  policy-making
patterns  like  Merkozy,  given  that  the  main  theory  social  scientists  currently  employ  to  study
international  organizations  (IOs)  does  not  provide an explicit  explanation for  them.  According to
neoliberal institutionalism, institutions exist because they mitigate informational problems inherent in
international and decentralized bargaining (Keohane 1984; Milner & Moravcsik 2009; Broz, Frieden
& Schultz 2009; Pollack 2003). Therefore, such highly institutionalized setups as the EU should be
necessary and possibly sufficient to promote inter-governmental cooperation on all matters covered by
the corresponding treaties, and perhaps also various germane ones. IOs are a solution, and perhaps the
solution; they should not be a problem. Yet, the politics of EU crisis management contrast sharply with
the theory. Far from being deemed necessary and sufficient to resolve the crisis, formal institutions of
centralized  bargaining  were  seen  as  a  problem to  be  resolved.  Thus,  policy-making patterns  like
Merkozy create a puzzle for IO theory: why did some countries resort to informal and decentralized
bargaining if there already existed institutions that allowed them to propose and adopt the measures
they pushed for? Were the existing institutions more an obstacle than a means to solve the problems
that European leaders faced? If this is the case, then current theories of European integration and the
role of IOs might need to be amended.
1 Other prominent decentralized institutions used in the crisis management were the ‘Task force’ of ECOFIN
minister headed by EUCO President Van Rompuy, and the so-called ‘Frankfurt Group’.
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2Hence, this article asks two questions: Why did the ‘Merkozy duumvirate’ emerge? What does its
emergence imply for the theorizing on EU institutions and institutional change?  Based on the work of
Adrienne Héritier, two different approaches are used, which both appear particularly suited to explain
the puzzle. The first approach is based on rationalist negotiation theory (Héritier 1999). In this respect,
Merkozy is considered an instance of a typical negotiation strategy employed by Germany: By striking
a deal with one or a few crucial actors already ahead of multilateral negotiations, a powerful actor can
accelerate  the  negotiations,  pool  power  resources,  and  emphasize  her  own preferences  within the
pursuit  of  a  final  agreement.  The  second  approach  relies  on  incomplete  contracts  theory.  This
functionalist  institutionalist  approach  posits  that  Merkozy  is  a  decentralized,  informal  institution
(Farrell  and  Héritier  2003)  which  is  a  reaction  to  the  increasing  uncertainty  caused  (rather  than
mitigated) by the centralized institutions and which occurred in a moment when quick and effective
decisions needed to be reached.
The  article’s  primary  contribution  thus  consists  in  the  elaboration  of  two  theoretically  informed
explanations of informal and decentralized policy-making in Europe. It thereby addresses a gap in the
literature: even the latest prominent attempt of theorizing new modes of policy-making in Europe does
not address the role of informal ad-hoc institutions, although it puts decentralized policy coordination
and  informal  governance  at  the  centre  of  its  analysis  (Bickerton,  Hodson  &  Puetter  2015).2
Theoretically, the article adds to the existing literature by relating approaches based on negotiation
theory (Héritier 1999) to the role powerful actors can play in the causation of institutional change
(Héritier 2007: 40-66) and regional integration (Mattli 1999). Moreover, it is shown that centralized
bargaining certainly mitigates some kinds of uncertainties – as relevant theorists of IOs argue – but it
also creates new ones. Empirically, the contribution concerns the research on EU policy-making. By
examining the Merkozy duumvirate, the article aims at explaining one of the central decision-making
modes  which  emerged  during  the  crisis.  The  analysis  is  based  on  newspaper  articles,  original
documents such as government statements, summit conclusions, and drafts of negotiating agreements,
2 Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter (2015: 705, 713f) suggest the broad category of ‘de novo institutions’, but these
are neither informal nor ad hoc.
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3as  well  as  16 semi-structured interviews with closely involved officials3 at  the  EU institutions  in
Brussels and the German Ministry of Finance in Berlin.
In the remainder, the two theoretical approaches are first presented, before they are applied separately
to Merkozy and its role in shaping the Fiscal Compact (FC). In the conclusion, the theoretical and
empirical implications are drawn.
A Bargaining Perspective: Strategic Pre-negotiations
With regard to EU policy-making, Héritier (1999) has shown that actors use informal strategies and
policy patterns (‘subterfuge’) to circumvent formal institutional rules which otherwise would make
them end up in stalemate. Transferred to an individualistic perspective, these findings suggest that by
using informal strategies, a single actor might achieve individually better outcomes than by relying on
formal institutions. However, given that the use of strategies requires resources, strategies cannot be
employed by any actor at any time, but are a privilege of the most powerful.
Power is based on resources. They can be differentiated into material,  institutional,  and ideational
resources (Krotz & Schild 2013: 22-4). Material resources can be of military or economic nature.
Institutional resources refer to procedural rights of decision-making, such as agenda management, veto
rights, or executive competences. Ideational resources, finally, comprise information, credibility, and
legitimacy. The article posits that actors translate these resources into strategies in order to reach an
agreement in their interest.
3 The authors ensured anonymity to all interviewees. Of the 16 interviewees explicitly referred to in this article,
8 were Heads of Unit (HoU) in the Commission, Council, national ministry, or Permanent Representations, 7
occupied positions higher than HoU level, and 1 interviewee was an administrator of the Commission. They
were all ‘closely involved’ in the sense that they carried out one or more of the following activities related to the
Fiscal Compact, which is the empirical scope of this article’s case study (see below): drafting of conclusions,
negotiation agreements and/or treaty texts, ‘translating’ the general agreement struck by the heads of states into
the concrete treaty text, supporting the President of the European Council, assisting in the coordination of the
negotiations  at  several  levels,  advising  the  Commission  on  the  Fiscal  Compact,  communicating  the
Commission’s positon on the Fiscal Compact, participating in the negotiations on the treaty text, preparing or
representing a member state’s negotiating position.
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4To this end, powerful actors can either try to shape the preferences of the others (‘providing common
knowledge’),  or they can take them as given and employ negotiation strategies to find a common
agreement (‘enhancing collective action’).
Table 1: Strategies
The first  set  of  strategies (‘Providing Common Knowledge’)  is  of  special  importance in the early
phases  of  policy-making.  In  the  context  of  politics,  ‘common  knowledge’  is  understood  as  a
collectively shared set of beliefs about which policy instrument works best in a certain situation. A
group’s  collective  knowledge  can  be  unsettled  by  exogenous  events  like  crises.  In  these  cases,
uncertainty rises and the group suffers a pressure for adaptation. A powerful actor can provide new
common knowledge by exposing the drawbacks of the status quo, coming up with new interpretations
and ideas, and promoting them as solutions to the defined problems (Schofield 2002).
The  second  set  of  strategies  (‘Enhancing  Collective  Action’)  serves  to  “solve  or  circumvent  the
collective action problems that plague the efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in processes of
institutional bargaining” (Young 1991: 285). Agenda-management can be differentiated into agenda-
setting,  -structuring,  and  -exclusion  (Tallberg  2006:  24).  Through  agenda-setting  the  zone  of
agreement can be widened, which is the case when package deals or side-payments are made. Agenda-
structuring  concerns  the  sequence  different  issues  or  proposed  solutions  are  dealt  with.  Agenda-
exclusion refers either to the subtraction of a particularly divisive issue from the agenda or to the
exclusion of possible solutions.
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5Arena-shifting, or the mere threat of doing so, can also help powerful actors to reach an agreement in
their interest (Héritier 1999: 20f; 2007: 29f). This does not necessarily require that an alternative arena
exists.  Actors  can  also  create  new  arenas  by  altering  the  decision-making  rules  or  the  eligible
participants (Eberlein & Radaelli 2010: 789f). This is closely related to coalition-building: A powerful
actor can facilitate the finding of an agreement by adding parties which have an interest in a settlement
or  subtracting  those  which  do  not  (Lax  & Sebenius  1986:  228f).  Unilateral  action  “is  exercised
whenever one moves to solve a collective problem by one's own effort, thereby setting the pace for
others to follow” (Underdal 1994: 183). ‘Leading by example’, finally, refers to the attraction and co-
optation of others to the own way of doing things: either the others switch to the more powerful actor’s
policy because it is less costly for them, or the powerful actor contributes resources to a common
project, thereby signalling credible commitment (Hermalin 1998).
In reality, these ideal-typical strategies are frequently combined or merged (e.g. Eberlein & Radaelli
2010). This article conceptualizes one such combination which is of special relevance in the context of
EU politics: strategic pre-negotiations.4 The basic idea is to start negotiations outside the central arena
with a few crucial actors in order to shape a compromise which can subsequently be presented to
others in the central negotiations.
This kind of anticipated and decentralized bargaining combines the advantages of arena-shifting and
coalition-building: if it is expected to be difficult or impossible to reach an agreement in the central
arena, the issue(s) can be moved to another arena where the participants are selected according to their
importance for a final agreement. This group of participants can strategically be altered by adding or
subtracting parties. Thereby a strong coalition can be formed already prior to the actual negotiations.
Thus, once an agreement has been reached in this second arena, the chances are considerably higher
that it will be accepted also by the remaining parties in the central arena.
4 Strategic pre-negotiations, and especially those between France and Germany, are not a new phenomenon in
EU politics (e.g. Janning 2005: 826; Krotz & Schild 2013; Webber 1999). According to a bargaining perspective,
which  is  the  first  of  the  two  theoretical  approaches  put  forward  by  this  article,  Merkozy,  despite  its
unprecedented public salience and dominance in EU crisis management, is one instance of such pre-negotiations.
The  contribution  consists  in  conceptualizing  these  pre-negotiations  based  on  rationalist  bargaining  theory
(Héritier 1999; 2007: 40-66), and showing that this provides a proper analytical tool to analyse the emergence of
Merkozy in EU crisis management.
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6A  ‘pre-negotiated’  deal  functions  like  an  already  evolved  agenda:  it  structures  the  negotiation,
facilitates the communication and coordination among the parties (which is especially important in
larger groups), and already has the support of a significant proportion of the contracting parties. As a
consequence, it accelerates the negotiations and increases the prospects of a final agreement. The time-
saving effect of pre-negotiations is especially valuable in times of crisis,  when swift reactions are
normally more important than under ordinary circumstances. In sum, “prenegotiations […] reduce the
transaction costs of complex multilateral negotiations and thus provide efficiency gains” (Schild 2013:
36).
At the same time, pre-negotiations offer considerable gains to the actor employing them. By co-opting
one  or  more  crucial  actors  ahead of  the  actual  negotiations,  power  resources  can  be  pooled  and
subsequently  be  used  in  the  central  negotiations.  This  provides  more  leverage  in  the  central
bargaining, be it due to institutional advantages such as a greater voting weight, or due to the increased
capacity to compensate potential losers. Finally, pre-negotiations allow powerful actors to ‘split up’
their opponents into more bargaining rounds instead of facing them en bloc.
An Incomplete Contracts Theory of EU Institutions
This  section seeks to  contribute  to  explaining the emergence of  decentralized,  inter-governmental
institutions, such as the Elysée treaty and Merkozy, in an institutional environment characterized by
the  presence  of  a  strong network  of  supranational  institutions  like  the  EU.  This  approach is  not
intended to be a substitute to IO theory, but rather a complement to account for the emergence of ad
hoc institutions. Whereas IO theory answers well why IOs are created, and correctly insists on the far-
reaching implications of the fact that contracts between two or more states are never detailed enough
to take into account all possible future contingencies, it does not offer much in terms of analysing
actual IOs’ behaviour. To the extent that the new ad hoc institutions aimed precisely at correcting
certain actual features of the existing institutions, the latter forms part of governments’ calculus, and
should therefore be integrated into existing theories of European integration and European institutions.
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7It is worth pointing out that the underlying definition of ‘institutions’ is game-theoretical. Following
Calvert, institution is understood as “an equilibrium of behaviour in an underlying game [...] It must be
rational for nearly every individual to almost always adhere to the behavioural prescriptions of the
institution,  given that nearly all  other individuals are doing so” (Calvert 1995: 60).  Note that  this
definition contrasts, for example, with North’s (1990: 3) better known understanding of institutions as
humanly devised constraints (or ‘rules of the game’). Moreover, “incomplete contracts” are understood
as institutions that are “vulnerable to reinterpretation ex post in circumstances that were not initially
foreseen” (Farrell and Héritier 2007: 289).
The theoretical framework proposed here can be summarized as follows. Two national governments
seek  to  cooperate  in  a  game with  mixed  motives,  whereby (a)  trading  policies  with  each  other
produces  certain  gains,  but  (b)  outperforming  each  other  is  an  electorally  valuable
asset. Anticipating opportunistic behaviour from each other, these governments consider delegating
enforcement powers to an international body enjoying considerable independence – in the EU context,
the Commission. Yet, as Principal-Agent theory suggests (Pollack 2003, Miller G. J. 2005), autonomy
comes with information asymmetry that can be used by the agent to pursue its own policy goals. The
enforcer can use its  power  to  discriminate between the governments  at  the  implementation stage.
Moreover, the collegial nature of the Commission can make its outcomes inconsistent through time
and unpredictable.5
Therefore, the trade-off is clear. On the one hand, delegation to supranational institutions is necessary
in order to make commitments credible and allow countries to gain from cooperation. On the other, it
introduces uncertainty about future policy outcomes. This may not be a problem when the countries’
time horizon is relatively long or the national governments perceive the delegated policy as not salient.
However, as saliency increases and the time horizon shrinks, uncertainty becomes more and more
costly. Also, not all countries have the same to lose from a crisis. Therefore, it can be expected that
5 According to Arrow’s impossibility theorem, if the preferences of the members of a voting body display a
modicum of diversity, then majority voting needs not generate a transitive ordering of the alternatives available
for choice; rather, the alternatives cycle, even though individual preferences are coherent. Indeed, incoherence
will often take the form of the non-existence of a collectively ‘best’ alternative,  and the final  outcome will
therefore be arbitrary (Hinich & Munger 1997: 95-9).  It  follows that  neither the individual members of the
voting  body  nor  outside  observers  (in  this  case,  national  governments)  can  know  the  results  before  the
occurrence of the vote.
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8some Member States, which have much at stake in a given situation, will perceive as particularly acute
the uncertainty related to the Commission’s institutional design. In this respect, the Eurozone crisis
may  be  seen  as  a  situation  in  which  some  countries  wanted  to  avoid  as  much  as  possible  an
involvement of the EC both in the decision-making and in the implementation phase. With regard to
the first purpose, decentralized  informal institutions like Merkozy reduced the uncertainty regarding
the negotiation outcomes; regarding the second, decentralized  formal  institutions that restricted the
enforcement power of the Commission as a whole, like the FC, also served to achieve the same goal.6
Decentralized Bargaining in Shaping the Fiscal Compact
In this section, the two theoretical approaches outlined above are used to explain the emergence of
Merkozy in the  Eurozone crisis.  In  order to  test  the  plausibility of  the theoretical  arguments,  the
emergence of Merkozy needs to be analysed in the context of a clear-cut event. The FC is particularly
suited for this exercise: compared to other eligible cases, it is relatively short, its beginning and end
are easily determinable, and the relevant actors can be clearly identified. Moreover, Merkozy played a
pivotal role in its shaping (Schild 2013: 35, 38f).
The FC7 is  an intergovernmental  treaty outside EU law, which was agreed upon at  the European
Council of 8/9 December 2011. The negotiations on the details took place in the two months after, so
that the treaty could already be endorsed at the European Council of 30 January 2012. It was formally
signed on 2 March 2012 by all  EU MSs except the UK and the Czech Republic. The signatories
commit themselves to a budget which is balanced or in surplus. In order to reach that goal they agree
on  an  automatic  correction  mechanism  established  by  their  national  law  at  a  constitutional  or
equivalent level. The implementation of the provisions is to be monitored by independent national
institutions.
6 See also Merkozy’s attempt to appoint a super-commissioner in charge of the Euro (Karagiannis & Guidi
2014).
7 Formally: ‘Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union’.
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9Merkozy as Recurrent Strategic Pre-negotiations
According  to  a  bargaining  approach  as  outlined  above,  Merkozy  is  an  instance  of  a  negotiation
strategy employed by a powerful actor. In the context of the FC, Germany used the cooperation with
France as a strategic tool to realize its preferences on crisis management, namely a new treaty which
shifts the adjustment costs of the crisis to the national level. The validity of this argument relies on the
premise that Germany indeed has a dominant position in the Eurozone that allows it to unilaterally
employ negotiation strategies to further its ends. Moreover, it  needs to be shown that the FC was
actually a case in which Germany assumed a pro-active role and employed strategies to realize its
goals.
As outlined above, power resources can be distinguished into material, institutional, and ideational
resources. Germany’s power in the Eurozone relies primarily on its economic resources. The most
important indicator for material resources in the context of the crisis is the aggregate GDP because it
determines the capacity to contribute to financial stability in the Eurozone. However, also a MS’s
refinancing options (government bond yields), its savings potential (current account balance), and its
long-term solvency (gross public debt) are relevant. Table 2 shows Germany’s superiority in terms of
economic power resources at a glance. In 2011, it had the largest GDP in the Eurozone, the lowest
interest rates for its debt (decreasing trend), and the biggest current account surplus in absolute terms.
Although the debt level of 77.9% was much less impressive, it was still  lower than the Eurozone
average of 86.0%.
Table 2: Germany’s Economic Power Resources (2011)
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These  superior  economic  resources  have  an  amplifying  effect  on  Germany’s  institutional  and
ideational  resources.  As  regards  institutional  power, Germany’s formal  resources  in  the  European
Council  do  not  exceed  those  of  other  MSs  because  decisions  are  taken  by  consensus.  Although
Germany’s formal voting weight in the Eurogroup and ECOFIN Council exceeded those of most other
MSs, also in these fora “there is a strong sense to come to joint, common solutions” (Interview 15).
This de facto unanimity rule in combination with its economic resources vests Germany with huge
institutional power: As a high-level official in Brussels put it: “Germany practically has a veto on
whatever is happening at present. And if they don’t like it, they don’t take it. So you need to rewrite,
and rewrite, and rewrite, until the Germans are in agreement” (Interview 13; also Interviews 10, 11).
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As regards ideational resources, Germany has roughly the same information and expertise as other
MSs. Its credibility, instead, is higher than that of the other MSs because of two different sources.
First, the high credibility Germany enjoys  in the capital markets is essential to the stability of the
common currency.8 Second, the strong roles of the German Parliament and the Constitutional Court
function as  a credible  commitment  at  the  European level  (Interviews 3,  15,  25).  Also as  regards
legitimacy, Germany was perceived to have the biggest claim to a hearing among the MSs because of
its economic weight (Interview 2; Spiegel & Schäuble 2011). In sum, on all three types of resources,
Germany scores the same or higher than the other MSs.
With regard to Germany’s use of strategies, the FC largely reflects German priorities and would not
even have been on the agenda without Germany strongly pushing for it (Ludlow 2012a: 29). Since this
article  focuses  particularly on strategic  pre-negotiations,  only some of  Germany’s most  important
strategic moves are highlighted in the following.
Most notably, the German government made use of arena-shifting. By bringing the issue directly to the
level  of  the  heads  of  state  and government,  the  Commission  and  the  European  Parliament  were
circumvented and the signal effect of the legal provisions was considerably strengthened (Ludlow
2012b: 3). Moreover, when it turned out that the UK would veto a Treaty change, Merkel shifted the
arena again by pushing for an international treaty outside EU law (Beach 2013: 118f; Crossland 2011).
As regards agenda-managing, Germany made the financial assistance of the ESM conditional on the
ratification of the FC and included the French demand for formal ‘Euro summits’. It thus managed to
ensure the signature of those MSs which were sceptical with regard to further budgetary restrictions
(Interviews 10, 11; Beach 2013: 117-9, 126). Furthermore, the German government provided common
knowledge: Already in August 2011, Germany and France proposed the incorporation of a ‘debt brake’
8 The relatively sound public finances in Germany are often traced back to the role of ordoliberalism as guiding
principle of German economic policy. However, a closer look reveals that the concepts of ordoliberalism and
stability culture do not necessarily determine the German policy as such, but are rather used rhetorically in a
strategic manner to legitimize a certain policy whenever this appears to be useful (Howarth & Rommerskirchen
2013). When it is detrimental, instead, Germany itself has often not followed ordoliberal principles: in 2003 it
not only violate the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), but also halted the application of the Excessive Deficit
Procedure; in 2005 it succeeded in relaxing the same rules it had promoted eight years earlier; and in 2008 and
2009  it  reacted  to  its  economic  crisis  at  home by  adopting  two  voluminous  stimulus  packages  instead  of
implementing austerity measures. At present, Germany’s debt level of more than 70% considerably exceeds the
limits of the SGP and its huge current account surplus even fosters instability in the Eurozone. Nevertheless,
ordoliberalism remains  a  strategic  resource  if  it  comes  to  the  legitimization  of  German  preferences  in  the
Eurozone (Bulmer 2014).
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into  national  constitutions  (Bundesregierung  2011b).  In  the  months  after,  Germany  used  all  its
diplomatic weight to promote the idea: German ambassadors approached the respective governments
in the MSs, bilateral meetings took place at all levels, all possible fora were used to promote the idea
of a debt brake (including the IMF and the G7), and the chancellor herself met her colleagues to
promote the FC (Interviews 15, 26; Rinke 2011). In sum, Germany has a dominant position in the
Eurozone and used strategies to shape the FC. Thus, the empirical premises for analysing Merkozy as
an instance of strategic pre-negotiations are given.
Especially within the institutional setting of the EU, pre-negotiations play a crucial role (Janning 2005:
826). With regard to the Franco-German case, it has been pointed out that pre-negotiated deals are
particularly  effective  when  the  two  MSs  do  not share  preferences:  In  this  case  they  have  to
compromise, whereby the resulting deal covers a larger range of the other MSs’ preferences and is
therefore more likely to result  in a final agreement (Webber 1999: 182f). In the remainder of this
section, it is shown that Merkozy was indeed an instance of this strategy.
The idea of  a  Fiscal  Pact  provided ideal  conditions for the  use  of strategic  pre-negotiations  with
France. Although “there was a collective recognition” (Interview 15) that such a signal was needed to
calm the markets and stabilize the Eurozone, France was very sceptical at the beginning. Instead of
stricter budgetary rules, it would have preferred a rather discretionary ‘gouvernement économique’ and
the mutualisation of risk as firewalls against the markets (Interviews 1, 5, 7, 8, 25, 27; Beach 2013:
116f; Schild 2013: 28-30). Hence, Germany and France had divergent preferences, which is why a pre-
negotiated deal was an effective means for Germany to push through the desired treaty without getting
stuck in the negotiations.
Already the first  step was made together with France by writing a joint letter to Van Rompuy in
August  2011 (see above).  For supporting the idea of a  ‘debt  brake’,  France was compensated by
including the codification of ‘Euro summits’ into the treaty (Schild 2013: 28, 38).9 The Euro summit
9 By  most  MSs,  the  Fiscal  Compact  was  perceived  as  the  counter-price  for  Germany  joining  the  ESM
(Interviews 8, 25). However, Germany and France agreed on a permanent rescue fund (ESM) already at their
Deauville deal in October 2010 (Schild 2013: 31). The Fiscal Compact, in contrast, was put on the agenda by
Germany only later. France was initially very sceptical and gave its support only in August 2011 (Schild 2013:
38) after Germany accepted to formalize regular Euro summits in the same treaty.
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statement of October 26, 2011, where the Eurozone leaders formalised their summits and agreed on
the adoption of ‘debt-brakes’ in national legislations, was based on this Franco-German compromise
(European Council 2011a; Beach 2013: 116f).
Three days before the decisive European Council in December, the German Chancellor repeated the
strategy. On 5 December 2011, she met the French President in Paris (Crossland 2011). This time the
aim was different, though. First, it was becoming evident that the UK would veto a treaty amendment.
Thus, Germany needed the French support for a treaty outside EU law without the UK. Second, based
on his mandate to prepare a report on treaty amendments, Van Rompuy was working on own plans
how to reform the Eurozone.  These plans differed considerably from the German preferences and
included the already overruled Eurobonds, a banking license for the ESM, and an alternative legal path
instead of Treaty amendments (Wittrock 2011; EurActiv 2011; Ludlow 2012a: 7-9). Thus, Germany
needed to secure French support also against Van Rompuy’s initiative. In fact, when the President of
the European Council presented his proposal two days before the summit started, Germany and France
replied within only one day by releasing a joint letter, rejecting Van Rompuy’s ideas and outlining
their own position (Bundesregierung 2011a; Ludlow 2012a: 10f). In sum, the second Franco-German
meeting in the preparation of the FC was not about finding a compromise between the two big MSs,
but about pooling power resources in order to circumvent the UK’s veto and to side-line the President
of the European Council.
The enormous impact of this second Franco-German initiative on the negotiations and their outcomes
corroborates the explanation that Merkozy was actually a strategic tool for the German government to
realize its preferences on EU crisis management. As can be seen from table 3, the joint letter already
contains  the  main  elements,  partly  with  identical  wording,  of  the  ensuing  Euro  Area  Statement
(European Council 2011c) and the first negotiation draft of the Fiscal Compact (European Council
2011b). In contrast, these two crucial documents do not contain the above-mentioned proposals by Van
Rompuy. Moreover, the fact that only the codification of Euro Summits is a French preference, while
all the other elements reflect German preferences, further strengthens the interpretation of Merkozy as
a strategic venue employed by Germany.
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Table 3: Impact of Franco-German letter on Euro Area Statement and First Draft of Fiscal Compact
Especially the last element listed in table 3 reveals Germany’s impact on the negotiation outcomes
through  the  use  of  Merkozy.  The  Fiscal  Compact  as  primary  law  was  an  exclusively  German
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preference which originally was neither shared by France nor by other MSs (Beach 2013: 118; Schild
2013: 37). Although Van Rompuy, who had the mandate to prepare a basis for negotiation, proposed to
realize  all  changes  through  secondary  law,  Merkozy  suggested  not  only  treaty  change,  but  in
anticipation of a British veto also an international treaty among the Eurozone MSs. The fact that even
with regard to this issue, Merkozy’s “proposal to our European partners” (Bundesregierung 2011a: 4)
prevailed over Van Rompuy’s proposal which was backed by the supranational institutions and most
other MSs, corroborates the theoretical expectation that pre-negotiated deals can function like already
evolved agendas.
Finally, while the details of the treaty content were negotiated in January 2012 at the level of high-
ranking diplomats and Finance Ministers, Merkel and Sarkozy met several times to discuss the content
in parallel to the negotiations (Ludlow 2012b: 7).
Reducing uncertainty: Merkozy and the Fiscal Compact
As illustrated above, Merkozy and the FC can be seen as instances of decentralization, in terms of both
decision-making  (as  they  reduce  the  role  of  the  Commission  and  of  the  other  EU supranational
institutions  vis-à-vis  Member  States)  and  policy  implementation  (as  they  reduce  the  enforcement
powers of the Commission and excluding automatic competences of the Court of Justice of the EU).
On the one hand,  the article argues that Merkozy was ‘set up’ by its  two members to reduce the
uncertainty of EU policy-making, especially in terms of agenda-setting. On the other, the FC can be
interpreted as a means to side-line the Commission (but also the European Parliament) when imposing
tougher limits on national budgets. Why did this happen? Following incomplete contracts theory, it is
argued that this was due to the nature of EU institutions, and to the particular time constraints that the
relevant actors faced in 2011-12.
The financial crisis of 2008-09 had turned into a sovereign debt crisis in Europe, with countries like
Greece, Ireland and Portugal that needed to be bailed out between 2010 and 2011, while the situation
of much bigger economies like Italy and Spain (whose failure would have most likely meant the end
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of the Euro as such) was more and more uncertain. EU MSs needed to act quickly in order to restore
credibility. It was clear that credibility alone was not sufficient to solve the crisis – indeed, Draghi’s
“whatever it takes” of July 2012 was probably more effective than all the legislative and institutional
changes of the previous months.10 However, it must be stressed that without a clear commitment to
fiscal  discipline  from  all  the  MSs,  the  ECB would  have  probably  been  unable  to  announce  the
‘Outright  Monetary Transactions’.  The perception that  the EU was doing “too late and too little”
(Fabbrini  2013:  1018)  boosted  financial  speculation  and  appeared  to  make  a  recovery  more
troublesome.
In line with the theoretical argument presented above, Germany and other countries indeed perceived
EU institutions more as an obstacle than as a useful tool for bargaining a way out of the crisis. As is
evident  from  the  interviews  conducted  by  the  authors,  the  EU  institutions  were  perceived  as
ambivalent and too prone to the interests of ‘Euro-losers’ (see below). For Germany and France, the
decentralized institutions, and Merkozy in particular, were a way to ‘neutralize’ extreme positions and
to make it  impossible for the centralized, collegial  institutions to exert  excessive influence on the
result of the negotiation – which might have been discriminatory for them. Merkozy was therefore
employed in order to restrict the number of possible outcomes. 
The fact that already in June 2010 the European Council delegated the task of drafting proposals for
reinforcing the governance of the Eurozone not only to the Commission, but also to a ‘Task force’
composed by the ECOFIN members and the President of the European Council,  corroborates this
interpretation.  As  Chang  (2013)  argues,  this  was  a  way  to  monitor  the  EC  and  avoid  shirking.
Although the ‘Sixpack’ measures were formally decided under the Community method, the influence
of decentralized institutions on its development and drafting is not comparable with what normally
happens  under  the  ordinary  legislative  procedure  (see  Bressanelli  and  Chelotti  2015).  From  the
underlying  theoretical  point  of  view, the  ‘Task  force’ was  a  first  attempt  to  create  an  informal,
decentralized institution in charge of steering the reform process. However, its heterogeneity largely
10 In a speech given at a conference in London on 25 July 2012, Draghi stated: “Within our mandate, the ECB is
ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.”
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reproduced the pitfalls of the centralized institutions that it was supposed to monitor. Hence it is not
surprising that Germany and France soon had recourse to a more cohesive and effective institution. 
Moreover, although as an institution it was quite short-lived, as long as the ‘duumvirate’ existed it was
rather  effective in  imposing its  own agenda on such diverse  matters  as  the  Tobin tax,  the  super-
commissioner  for  the  Euro,  the  hair-cut  on  the Greek sovereign  debt,  the  strengthening  of  fiscal
governance. Apart from its role in shaping the FC as described in the previous section, Merkozy set
the agenda on a number of other issues: it repeatedly called for strengthening the governance of the
Eurozone (coupling traditional French proposals like a European Tobin-tax and regular Euro summits
while insisting on fiscal discipline as Merkel wanted)11; it proposed ambitious reforms of the structure
of the Commission in the form of a commissioner in charge of vetoing national budgets (Karagiannis
&  Guidi  2014);12 it  took  a  common  stance  on  rejecting  the  Greek  government’s  proposal  of  a
referendum  on  the  bailout  agreement.13 Though  it  was  not  always  successful,  it  undoubtedly
monopolized the EU agenda-setting in 2011 and the first half of 2012. For the purpose of this analysis,
it  is  important  to  highlight  that,  regardless  of  its  achievements,  Merkozy  was  recognized  as  an
institution, both by the two members and by their opponents.14
Turning to the FC, it must be noted that, even though the UK’s opposition can explain why the MSs
could not choose to change the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, it does not explain why they
chose to adopt an international treaty. According to several accounts, the provisions contained in the
11 The Guardian, “Sarkozy and Merkel call for 'true economic government' to save eurozone”, 16 August 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/aug/16/sarkozy-merkel-economic-government-eurozone.  See  also
Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung  (‘FAZ’),  “Berlin  und  Paris  übernehmen  die  Führung”,  2  December  2011,
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/merkozy-berlin-und-paris-uebernehmen-die-fuehrung-11549225.html;
Reuters,  “Sarkozy  and  Merkel’s  letter  to  Van  Rompuy”,  07  December  2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/07/us-eurozone-france-letter-idUSTRE7B612Y20111207.
12 See also Spiegel Online International, “Battle to Save the Euro: Summit Seen Backing 'Merkozy' Plan - But
Then  What?”,  7  December  2011,  http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/battle-to-save-the-euro-summit-
seen-backing-merkozy-plan-but-then-what-a-802221.html. 
13 Der  Spiegel,  “Tough  Words:  Merkel  and  Sarkozy  Halt  Payments  to  Athens”,  3  November  2011,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/tough-words-merkel-and-sarkozy-halt-payments-to-athens-a-
795638.html.
14 See  The  Economist,  “The  driver  and  the  passenger”,  15  October  2011,
http://www.economist.com/node/21532283; The Economist, “Beware the Merkozy Recipe”, 10 December 2011,
http://www.economist.com/node/21541405;  The  Guardian,  “French  election  could  spell  end  of  Merkozy
alliance”, 22 April 2012,  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/22/france-election-end-merkozy-alliance.
Le  Figaro,  “Le  couple  «Merkozy»  sort  gagnant  du  sommet,  9  December  2011,
http://www.lefigaro.fr/conjoncture/2011/12/09/04016-20111209ARTFIG00683-le-couple-merkozy-sort-
gagnantdu-sommet.php.  
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FT might have been passed through the Community method (see Kocharov 2012, Miller V. 2012). The
choice of adopting an international treaty, rather than EU secondary legislation, was strongly contested
by the Commission and by the members of the European Parliament.15 While it can be questioned
whether this makes enforcement more effective, it is evident that the FC was mainly a matter of form
rather than substance: the negotiations for the FC and the ‘Twopack’ proceeded in parallel,  and it
would have been very simple to adopt most FC provisions as EU secondary law (Interview 33). It was
Germany that  strongly  insisted  for  having  a  separate  treaty  (Interview 11).  This  interpretation  is
corroborated by the fact that the Commission, conversely, did not oppose the substance of the FC but
only the legal means used (Interview 12).  
The FC itself is a formal institution whose aim is similar to that of Merkozy and other decentralized
institutions (like the ‘Task force’ headed by Van Rompuy or the ‘Frankfurt group’16), i.e. limiting the
discretion of the Commission. The FC, in particular, limits the Commission’s discretion in budgetary
supervision, in that it anchors fiscal discipline in  national  law (Interview 6). A general distrust of a
group of countries towards the EC in this instance appears as the most relevant explanatory factor.
Several interviewees (Interview 6, 10, 27) pointed out that enforcement at the European level was not
considered to work necessarily better than national enforcement, as the former “depends ultimately on
the Commission’s courage and rigour” (Interview 10). The EC’s attitude during the crisis, in particular,
had been judged too hesitant and lenient by Germany and other countries (Interview 27). 
This lack of trust is evident if one analyses articles from 6 to 8 of the FC, where the Commission is
delegated some powers, but with all kinds of limitations and checks. See for instance Article 7, which
gives the Commission the power to submit recommendations “where it considers that a Member State
of the European Union whose currency is the euro is in breach of the deficit criterion in the framework
of an excessive deficit procedure”. While the parties commit to implement these recommendations, a
qualified majority of them can make the recommendation not binding. Similarly, the EC and the Court
of Justice’s powers in sanctioning countries for not complying with the treaty obligations are subject to
15 See Euractive Press Release, “Verhofstadt on EU summit: "Eurozone needs action not words"”, 31 January
2012, http://pr.euractiv.com/pr/verhofstadt-eu-summit-eurozone-needs-action-not-words-91988.
16 See  for  instance:  “A  crisis?  Call  the  F-team”,  The  Economist,  4  November  2011,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2011/11/euros-frankfurt-group
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a sort of “authorization” of at least one national government: only “one or more Contracting Parties”,
and not the Commission, can bring the matter to the Court of Justice (Article 8.1).
As argued above, the ‘instability of outcomes’ caused by the collegial nature of the EC is, in most
cases, beneficial to the MSs, because it guarantees cyclical outcomes and it ensures that no country is
permanently discriminated in the long run. This is why a relevant delegation of powers to the EC in
almost all the EU policy fields (for instance, the Common Agricultural Policy, Competition Policy,
Environmental Policy, and so forth) is perfectly rational according to this logic. These are policies
whose decision-making procedure and enforcement is carried out through a sufficiently long period of
time. What was different in the sovereign debt crisis was the time constraint: the perception that little
time was available and that the solution had to be immediately  effective. This ‘urgency’ made those
negotiations look like a one-shot game (not a repeated one, as is usually the case in EU politics).
Having just one shot available, Germany and France needed to be sure that it hit the target.
Conclusions
According to an approach based on negotiation theory, Merkozy emerged because it was an instance
of a particular strategy employed by Germany to further its ends in crisis management: strategic pre-
negotiations. By striking a deal with one or a few crucial actors ahead of the negotiations, a powerful
actor can reduce transaction costs, accelerate the decision-making process, and increase its leverage in
the central bargaining. According to an incomplete contracts theory of EU institutions, in contrast,
Merkozy was a decentralized institutions aimed at reducing the unpredictability of outcomes related to
the collegial nature of the EC.
Thus, the two approaches elaborated and applied in this article agree that Merkozy served to avoid
undesired consequences of central institutions to the advantage of one or a few powerful actors. At a
theoretical level, this implies that both informal strategies of policy-making (‘subterfuge’) and ad hoc
institutions of decentralized bargaining are ways of circumventing formal institutions.
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Moreover, these results bear implications for the theory of EU institutions and institutional change.
Firstly, by relating the entrepreneurial role of powerful actors to bargaining-oriented approaches of EU
policy-making, the article adds to the strand of distributive and power-based bargaining theories of
institutional  change  (Hériter  2007:  40-66).17 More  precisely, it  is  argued  that  the  employment  of
‘subterfuge’ strategies (Héritier 1999) by single powerful actors (here: strategic pre-negotiations in the
form of Merkozy employed by Germany) considerably affects the existence, direction, and extent of
institutional  innovation.  The empirical analysis strongly suggests that the FC as it  stands today is
hardly conceivable without Germany’s intense employment of these strategies. Secondly, an approach
based on incomplete contracts theory shows that not all ‘exchanges of policies’ between states are best
served  by  centralized  institutions.  In  particular,  the  article  shows  that,  independently  of  whether
international  regimes  economize  on  transaction  costs  and  make  commitments  credible,  their
institutional design matters, and probably does so to a greater extent than liberal institutionalist authors
argue. Institutions like the Commission, it is argued, carry with them the in-built uncertainty of organs
whose decision-making rule  is  majority  rule  with no restrictions  on amendments.  It  follows  that,
although such institutions eliminate some kinds of uncertainty, they also generate new ones. 
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